Caste In Indian Politics — Why It Still Matters In 2026
Once a decade, an Indian commentator declares that caste no longer organises political behaviour. Six months later, an election cycle proves them wrong. The 'caste is dead' takes are not stupid — they correctly identify that caste is no longer the only organising principle. They are still wrong because caste continues to be one of the most reliable predictors of voting behaviour in India.
What 'caste' means in Indian political analysis
Three different things, often conflated. (a) Varna — the four-fold textual classification (Brahmin, Kshatriya, Vaishya, Shudra) plus the historical excluded outside group (Dalits). (b) Jati — the thousands of endogamous birth groups that actually structure marriage, occupation, and social network. (c) Caste blocs — the political coalitions that parties build around groups of jatis, often using umbrella terms (OBC, SC, ST, Forward Castes).
Political analysis usually talks about caste blocs, not jatis. A 'Yadav vote' or 'Kurmi vote' or 'Brahmin vote' is a coalition of multiple jatis treated as a political unit. This abstraction is necessary for managing elections but obscures the underlying complexity.
The Mandal Commission watershed
The 1980 Mandal Commission report recommended 27% reservation in central government jobs and educational institutions for Other Backward Classes (OBCs). The Janata Dal government implemented it in 1990. This was the political moment that converted OBC identity from a sociological category into a political bloc with a clear electoral interest. The post-Mandal party system in north India (Lalu Yadav's RJD, Mulayam Singh Yadav's SP, Nitish Kumar's JD-U) was built on OBC consolidation.
What changed after Mandal
Three shifts. First, OBC and Dalit parties broke the monopoly of upper-caste-led parties on state-level governance in the Hindi belt. Second, the BJP's 1990s rise was, in significant part, a counter-coalition that combined upper-caste anchor support with new OBC outreach. Third, the Indian middle class, which was largely upper-caste in 1990, became more caste-diverse by 2020, which weakened the assumption that economic class would replace caste as the organising principle.
Why caste persists as a political category
Three structural reasons. (a) Caste is hereditary in a way class is not — your caste at birth predicts your caste at death much more reliably than your income at birth predicts your income at death. (b) Marriage in India remains overwhelmingly within caste (over 90% by most surveys), which means caste networks are reinforced every generation. (c) Reservation policy — the institutional mechanism that addresses historical caste discrimination — is itself organised around caste categories, which makes caste a continuing political fact.
What the 2024 election numbers show
Caste-cluster voting patterns remained strong but were softer than in 2014 or 2019. The 'unity' of major caste blocs was incomplete in several states; sub-jati cleavages within larger blocs became more visible. Welfare politics (cash transfers, ration entitlements) cut across caste lines in some places. None of this is the death of caste politics, but it is a more textured version of it.
What CJP's position on this is
Two things. First, any honest political project in India must engage with caste as a real political category. Pretending it doesn't exist is upper-caste blindness. Second, the manifesto's demands (50% women cabinet, anti-defection ban, voter-deletion penalties) are deliberately caste-neutral. Cross-caste solidarity in electoral organising is possible only on issues that cross caste — which is why the 5 Demands are framed structurally, not identity-first.
Further reading
Caste system in India on Wikipedia: en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Caste_system_in_India. Mandal Commission: en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mandal_Commission. Christophe Jaffrelot's body of work on Indian political sociology is the academic standard.
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